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OLD SOLUTIONS OF A NEW PROBLEM
When King David said in his haste that all men are liars, was
he led to acknowledge the hastiness of his remark through reflection on its logical consequences? If he were, he showed commendable delicacy in taking for granted that we should see what
the logicians insistently point out, that it must follow that he
himself could not be believed. Reflection on this problem of
verbal paradox has led some of the logicians, as well as the
Psalmist, to wonder whether they have not made haste too
rapidly. The paradox of the" Liar" is still with us; but modern
writers, less hurried than David, usually state it in a form which
leaves their own credibility beside the question and ponders only
that of Epimenides the Cretan, our authority for the statement
that all Cretans are liars. But with the most recent work in
logic the comfort of so disinterested a position shows signs of
forsaking us. Some of the solutions of this paradox begin to
involve our right to make any statement about truth or logic and
then claim that the statement itself is true or is logical. So Mr.
Bertrand Russell would have us grant that no statement can contain any reference to itself, and that when we wish to assert,
"All propositions have subject and predicate" or "Truth is
relative," then our statements themselves cannot be propositions
or be truth within the meaning of their subjects; nothing has
been said, he asserts, about the statements in which our thought
is couched.
The modern solutions of the "Liar" have been all offered by
makers of logistic, the present custodians of formal logic, and
quite properly so, since the difficulty with the paradox seems to
be essentially formal. That it is a difficulty which is serious for
the maker of an algebra of logic is shown by the size of the
literature that it has occasioned and is still occasioning.
In the recent attempts to solve the paradox several writers
have mentioned that there was a scholastic discussion of the
same problem which has left us many ingenious plans for its
solution. That the scholastic solutions were, several of them,
identical in principle with their modern successors is not so well23 6
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known. The solutions of Russell, Zermelo, Rftstow, Peirce,
Poincare, Herbart, and Shearman, all bear a close resemblance to
one or the other of the scholastic methods, whose interest for the
general student is often much greater than the solutions that have
been offered with a peculiar and intricate algebra of logic in
mind. Nor was the paradox unfamiliar to the ancients. Mr.
Alexander Rustow has collected a great number of references to
it in ancient writers, chiefly Aristotle, Plato, and Diogenes
Laertius-for it was of a sort calculated to attract the attention
of Greek lovers of eristic.
With the earlier writers the paradox was accepted as final and
its speculative interest lay in the fact that unavoidable paradox
could exist. Like Montaigne they asked what could be the value
of a human reason that could find itself in such straits. Later
writers were occupied in attempts to place the" Liar" among the
Aristotelian fallacies which were supposed to care for all logical
difficulties. There was no real statement of the difficulty, nor
was there any attempt to solve the paradox formally. These
came only with the more refined and formal logic of the scholastics.
We are given to dismissing medirevallogic with little attention;
and we are perhaps justified in so doing since a thorough study of
the involved definitions and rules that were set up by logicians
of that period would be impossible in the time allotted to the
life of one man; even Prantl's monumental history amounts to
little more than a collection of extracts under a limited number of
headings-extracts not always representative of the views of the
author quoted nor sufficient to present his theory. But this
massive literature is only a reflection of the fact that the spirit
for keen analysis and fine distinctions made the "Liar" an ideal
subject for tests of the agility of the medireval mind. Between
the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries each author of a logical text-book took his turn at the difficulty, and with a confidence in his results that has gone out of fashion in our more
sophisticated generation heralded a solution that should dispose
of the matter for all time.
It is uncertain when the name Insolubilia was first applied
to these paradoxes. The first medireval mention of them includes other puzzles not of this type, having in common with
this only the fact that they were difficult, puzzles like those of
Plato's Euthydemus. Gradually only those paradoxes that had
the peculiar and subtle difficulty of asserting their own falsity
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were included. Typical sentences that are to be found in a
number of lists are as follows:
I.
Ego dico falsum.
2.
Haec propositio est falsa.
3. Ponatur, quod Socrates dicat illam, "Plato dicit falsum, " et Plato dicat illam, "Socrates dicit verum. "
4. Si Deus est, aliqua conditionalis est falsa, et sit nulla alia
conditionalis.
These are from the list compiled by Albertus de Saxonia in
Vienna before 1390. The first of them, "Ego dico falsum,"
reduces to the type of the second, which is the most definite and
satisfactory of all, "Haec propositio est falsa"; the last makes its
own truth imply the falsity of a class of propositions to which it
itself belongs, as does "All propositions are false." The remainder of the long list either reduces to one of these two types
or is intrigued by the use of terms whose meaning is not definite;
as "Posito quod in mente Socratis sit ista, Socrates decipitur, et
nulla alia, et Socrates credat illam esse veram, quaeritur, an Socrates credendo eam esse veram, decipiatur" ; for in cases like this the
discussion can lose its way in disagreement over the meaning of
"to be deceived." Again, in "I lie" the word lie need not
mean that every statement is false and so need not lead to paradox at all. The real difficulty was sometimes lost sight of or
dismissed without comment.
One of the earliest solutions was offered by Buridan, writing
in the fourteenth century. In the Insolubilia, he holds, we have
propositions that are both true and false, unavoidably so by
logical rules. This is a contradiction of the law of excluded
middle. He seems to see but one opening to reject the law.
Perhaps further acquaintance with Buridan's work would show
some attempt to supplement this seemingly ruthless method by
showing how it would be possible to proceed without the law he
discards; for Buridan knew and described a method offered by a
contemporary, Hentisberus, that was more carefully planned.
At the basis of this method is the doctrine of restrictio worked out
in such detail by scholastic logic. Restriction means that the
denotation of a term, which, as far as explicit statement goes,
might betaken to be general, is often limited by the contextan approximation to the more modern and less definite universe
of discourse. In the case of the I nsolubilia this unexpressed
restriction limits the denotation of a term in a proposition whose
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verb is in the present tense to time immediately preceding the
present instant; the instant when the sentence is begun, and not
that in which it is uttered is the time represented by the verb.
This is only an unusual way of stating something we are all apt
to feel; namely, that no thought can really be "of itself"; before
we comment on a situation there must be the situation to comment on, the expression of any thought follows by appreciable
interval the suggestion of that thought. This solution disposes
of the paradox" I lie," since the statement cannot apply to itself
because the statement is not made until after it is begun. And in
a proposition like "This proposition is false" there is no statement to which the sentence can refer.
This same feeling that a proposition cannot refer to itself
suggested another very similar theory-one that proceeded without this reference to tense. Peter von Ailly wrote a tractate on
the I nsolubilia in which he makes a distinction between mental
and verbal propositions. Written and spoken propositions are
not properly true or false; they are only symbols for mental
propositions which alone have real meaning and truth. The
I nsolubilia are all verbal propositions, he contended; and mental
propositions cannot denote themselves. "Nulla propositio
mentalis proprie dicta potest significare, se ipsam esse veram, nee
potest habere reflexionem supra se ipsam. " We are given to
understand that though the form of our words may seem to refer
to itself, nevertheless the thought that leads to the expression
never has that character, but always refers to some object independent of it. The rule for avoiding the paradoxes becomes,
"Pars propositionis non potest supponere pro toto." This is not
far from the most recent solution offered by mathematical logic,
the principle of the vicious circle on which Russell's theory of
types is based: "Whatever contains an apparent variable must
not be one of the possible values of the variable."
This method of solution was a favourite with other writers,
Johannis Majoris Scotus, Olkot, and Rosetus among them. Its
similarity to Russell's theory is curiously paralleled by identical
criticisms, one in particular, directed at Paulus's theory by Wycliffe, whose Logic is less known than his historical works.
Wycliffe considers this rule that no proposition is to refer
to'itself and finds that it leads immediately to difficulty. What
shall we do about those general propositions, like" All propositions are true or false" and "All propositions have subject and

THE MID-WEST QUARTERLY
predicate," which pretend to refer to all propositions including
themselves. Yet we may mean to say that even tre proposition
we are using must be either true or false. The proposition" A is
A" would no longer be the general statement that it pretends, for
there would be one value of the" A" for which the proposition
would assert nothing, namely the value" A is A. " Following this
criticism our theologian offers as his own contribution a theory
that is rather a disappointment after his acute criticism of the
other view. The paradoxical statement, "This proposition is
false, " he says, is neither true nor false in one sense of those terms,
and so is no proposition at all. The criterion of truth in a proposition is correct representation of a situation independent of the
proposition itself, and where there is no such independent reference there can be neither truth nor falsity, and so there can be no
proposition. He does not go on to consider the effect of this
theory on the proposition, "All propositions are true or false,"
where there is both independent reference and self-reference; and
after all, on a little reflection, his theory of independent reference
amounts to the same thing as Peter's restrictio.
Mansell's Aldrich offers a solution like the two just described.
In the sentence, "Socrates speaks false," pronounced by Socrates himself there is nothing to which the sentence can refer, so
that it is absurd and says nothing; and besides, he says, the
disputes over the I nsolubilia are great nonsense. " Nihilque
opus est plura dicere de I nsolubilibus. "
To the same class as these solutions there belongs one suggested by the unknown author of a Paris manuscript which the
writer terms cassatio. I He denies that the propositions in question are propositions at all, but since he does not supplement
this denial with a definition of proposition that excludes these
questionable ones he offers only the beginning of a solution.
All of these solutions are of the restrictive type and make their
point by declaring that propo$itions cannot have reference to
themselves as these pretend to have. They rule out the I nsolubilia as illegitimate and meaningless statements. But there
is another type, different from these in principle, and, like the
theory of restriction, having its analogue in a modern theory.
This is to be found in the solution of Paulus Venetus and a
number of lesser writers. They decide that we may assume that
every proposition asserts its own truth, and that in addition
I

Prantl, vol. 4, p. 41.
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propositions in question assert also their own falsity. "Hoc est
jalsum significat quod hoc est jalsum et quod hoc est verum, sed quod
hoc sit jalsum et hoc sit verum est impossibile simpliciter." Such
solutions do not resolve the paradox, exactly, but they place it
in a class of false propositions on a par with" This pen has weight
and has not weight"; the Insolubilia are shown, not only to imply
contradictories, and hence to be paradoxical, but also to assert
contradictories, and so to be merely false.
These represent the more noteworthy methods of subjecting
the Insolubilia to logical rule. Other methods were attempted;
but these were of rhetorical rather than logical character, like
Cranston's contention that no proposition really falsifies itself
when the contrary can be rationally maintained.
With the close of the scholastic period interest in the Insolubilia died out almost entirely. Stray references to the paradoxes contain only expressions of wonder that men could ever
have been so misled by fondness for dispute as to split hairs on
so vain a subject. Even formal logic neglected, and, in more
modern times, the writers of logics not so formal despised, the
problem-dismissing it as easily as Lotze, for instance, who said
that there was no real difficulty involved when the speaker could
change his statement to "I lied" instead of "I lie" and all paradox would be avoided. It was not until the rigorous formulation
of modern mathematical logic forced them upon the notice of
logicians that the I nsolubilia were again recognised as significant.
And they are significant; for their problem, the problem of propositions whose denial involves their assertion, is identical with
the problem of the ontological proof of the existence of God. In
the upshot it is the problem not only of the limits of rational
discourse, but of the limits of rational thinking. Whether the
judgment that "There is no truth in us" can itself be a truth in
us, is a question to be determined by a close definition of truth
in terms of proposition and assertion. That II this proposition is
false" can be the substance of "this proposition" is a matter for
strict definition of "this, " and if there remains a paradox, that is,
if the proposition then has contradictory results, the cure is to
be sought in an amended definition, for the one that resulted in
contradictories will be found to contain contradiction in its own
statement.
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